Design and implementation of a fast and scalable NTT-based polynomial multiplier architecture by Mert, Ahmet Can et al.
Design and Implementation of a Fast and Scalable
NTT-Based Polynomial Multiplier Architecture
Ahmet Can Mert, Erdinc¸ O¨ztu¨rk, Erkay Savas¸
Faculty of Engineering and Natural Sciences
Sabanci University
Istanbul, Turkey
{ahmetcanmert, erdinco, erkays}@sabanciuniv.edu
Abstract—In this paper, we present an optimized FPGA
implementation of a novel, fast and highly parallelized NTT-
based polynomial multiplier architecture, which proves to be
effective as an accelerator for lattice-based homomorphic cryp-
tographic schemes. As I/O operations are as time-consuming as
NTT operations during homomorphic computations in a host
processor/accelerator setting, instead of achieving the fastest
NTT implementation possible on the target FPGA, we focus
on a balanced time performance between the NTT and I/O
operations. Even with this goal, we achieved the fastest NTT
implementation in literature, to the best of our knowledge. For
proof of concept, we utilize our architecture in a framework for
Fan-Vercauteren (FV) homomorphic encryption scheme, utilizing
a hardware/software co-design approach, in which polynomial
multiplication operations are offloaded to the accelerator via
PCIe bus while the rest of operations in the FV scheme
are executed in software running on an off-the-shelf desktop
computer. Specifically, our framework is optimized to accelerate
Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library (SEAL), developed by
the Cryptography Research Group at Microsoft Research [1],
for the FV encryption scheme, where large degree polynomial
multiplications are utilized extensively. The hardware part of the
proposed framework targets Xilinx Virtex-7 FPGA device and
the proposed framework achieves almost 11x latency speedup
for the offloaded operations compared to their pure software
implementations. We achieved a throughput of almost 800K
polynomial multiplications per second, for polynomials of degree
1024 with 32-bit coefficients.
Index Terms—Number Theoretic Transform, Large-Degree
Polynomial Multiplication, Fan-Vercauteren, SEAL, FPGA
I. INTRODUCTION
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) allows computa-
tions on encrypted data eliminating the need for the access
to plaintext data. FHE schemes provide privacy in various
applications, such as privacy-preserving processing of sen-
sitive data in cloud computing. The idea of FHE was first
introduced in 1978 [2] and it had been an open problem
until Gentry constructed the first functioning FHE scheme
in 2009 [3]. Since then various practical FHE schemes
have been introduced [4], [5], [6]. Despite the tremendous
performance improvement of FHE schemes over the years,
homomorphic computation is not yet quite feasible for many
cloud applications. There is still ongoing research and race to
improve the performance of arithmetic blocks of the working
FHE schemes. Different implementations and constructions
were developed to introduce practical hardware and software
implementations of FHE schemes, such as [7], HElib [8],
NFLlib [9], cuHe [10]. With the motivation of achieving
a practical FHE implementation, we focus on improving
performance of the most time consuming arithmetic block
of many FHE schemes in literature: large degree polynomial
multiplication. For proof of concept, we aim to obtain a
framework to accelerate the Fan-Vercauteren (FV) encryption
scheme for homomorphic operations [5].
There are various software and hardware implementations
of the FV scheme in the literature. Cryptography Research
Group at Microsoft Research developed Simple Encrypted
Arithmetic Library (SEAL) [1], providing a simple and prac-
tical software infrastructure using the FV homomorphic en-
cryption scheme for homomorphic applications [5]. SEAL
already gained recognition in the literature [11], [12], [13].
In our proof of concept framework, we utilize our NTT-based
polynomial multiplier design to accelerate SEAL software by
offloading large degree polynomial multiplication operations
to the hardware accelerator implemented on FPGA board.
In general, implementations of specialized hardware archi-
tectures for specific operations provide significant speed-up
over software implementations. On the other hand, it is neither
effective nor practical to offload all sorts of computation to
hardware accelerators. In most FHE schemes, the most-time
consuming operation is large degree polynomial multiplication
that involves vast number of modular multiplication opera-
tions over integers, majority of which is highly parallelizable.
Nevertheless, software performance is bounded by the number
of integer multipliers existing in CPU architectures limiting
the level of parallelization. Therefore, it makes perfect sense
to execute those operations in a hardware accelerator, which
should be designed to improve the overall performance of soft-
ware implementation of a FHE scheme by taking advantage of
parallelizable operations. Besides, offloading computation to
an accelerator results in overhead due to the time spent in the
network stack in both ends of the communication and actual
transfer of data, which we refer as the input-output (I/O) time.
This overhead can be prohibitively high if the nature and cost
of the offloading are not factored in the accelerator design.
To this end, two crucial design goals are considered in
this work: i) hardware accelerator architecture should be
designed to provide significant levels of speedup over software
implementations and ii) the overhead due to communication
between hardware and software components should be taken
into account as a design parameter or constraint. Most works
in the literature focus solely on the first goal and report
no accurate speedup values subsuming the I/O time. In this
paper, we aim to address this problematic by providing a fully
working prototype of a framework consisting of an FPGA
implementing a highly efficient accelerator and SEAL library
running on a CPU. Our contributions in this paper are listed
as follows:
• We present a novel FPGA implementation of a fast
and highly parallelized NTT-based polynomial multiplier
architecture. We introduce several optimizations for the
Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) operations. For ef-
ficient modular arithmetic, we employ lazy reduction
techniques as explained in [14]. We also slightly modify
the NTT operation loops in order to be able to efficiently
parallelize NTT computations. Since I/O operations are
as important as NTT operations running on the FPGA,
instead of achieving the fastest NTT implementation
possible on the target FPGA, we focus on a balanced
performance between the NTT and I/O operations on
the FPGA. Also, since our implementations are targeting
cryptographic applications, for security NTT hardware is
designed to run in constant time for every possible input
combination.
• We introduce a novel modular multiplier architecture for
any NTT-friendly prime modulus, which provides com-
parable time performance to those using special primes.
• We propose a framework including a high performance
FPGA device, which is connected to a host CPU. Our
proposed framework interfaces the CPU and the FPGA
via a fast PCIe connection, achieving a ∼32 Gbps half-
duplex I/O speed. For proof of concept, we accelerate
polynomial multiplications utilized in the encryption op-
erations of SEAL. Every time an encryption function
is invoked by SEAL, the polynomial multiplications are
offloaded to the FPGA device via the fast PCIe con-
nection. Our design utilizes 1024-degree polynomials to
achieve 128-bit security level. With our approach, latency
of polynomial multiplication is improved by almost 11x
with about a 17% utilization of the VIRTEX-7 resources.
With careful pipelining, I/O operations can be overlapped
with actual polynomial multiplications on hardware and
additional 3x throughput performance can be achieved
for pure polynomial multiplication. As the accelerator
framework provides a simple interface and supports a
range of modulus lengths for polynomial coefficients it
can easily be configured for use with other FHE libraries
relying on ring learning with errors security assumption.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we give definition of the FV scheme as
presented in [5] and arithmetic operations utilized in this
scheme.
A. FV Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
In [5], the authors present an encryption scheme based
on Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem [15]. The
RLWE problem is simply a ring based version of the LWE
problem [16] and leads to the following encryption scheme as
described in [15].
Let the plaintext and ciphertext spaces taken as Rt and Rq ,
respectively, for some integer t > 1. We remark that neither q
nor t have to be prime, nor that t and q have to be coprime. Let
⌊.⌉ and [.]q represent round to nearest integer and the reduction
by modulo q operations, respectively. Let ∆ and χ be ⌊q/t⌋
and a truncated discrete Gaussian distribution, respectively. Let
a
$
←− S represents that a is uniformly sampled from the set S.
Secret key generation, public key generation, encryption and
decryption operations described in Textbook-FV are shown
below.
• SecretKeyGen: s
$
←− R2.
• PublicKeyGen: a
$
←− Rq and e← χ.
(p0, p1) = ([−(a · s+ e)]q, a)
• Encryption: m ∈ Rt, u
$
←− R2 and e1, e2 ← χ.
(c0, c1) = ([∆ ·m+ p0 · u+ e1]q, [p1 · u+ e2]q)
• Decryption: m ∈ Rt
m = [⌊ t
q
[c0 + c1 · s]q⌉]t
B. Number Theoretic Transform
One of the high level fundamental operations in the FV
scheme is the multiplication of two polynomials of very
large degrees. Recently, there has been many publications in
literature about multiplication of two large degree polynomials
and the NTT-based multiplication schemes which provide the
most suitable algorithms for efficient multiplication of large
degree polynomials. In this work, we utilize the modified
version of iterative NTT scheme [7] shown in Algorithm 1,
which uses the modifications shown in [17]. Inverse NTT
(INTT) operation is performed using the same Algorithm 1
with ω−1 instead of ω.
C. Modular Arithmetic
NTT arithmetic involves a large amount of modular addi-
tion, subtraction and multiplication operations. For efficient
modular arithmetic operations, we employ techniques dis-
cussed in [14]. In this section we present hardware-friendly
constant-time modular arithmetic algorithms. For the rest of
the section, we assume a K-bit modulus q. Our modular arith-
metic operations compute numbers in the range [0, 2K − 1],
instead of [0, q − 1].
1) Modular Addition: A hardware-friendly constant-time
partial modular addition operation is shown in Algorithm 2.
Assume largest values for A and B are 2K − 1, and smallest
value for q is 2K−1 + 1.
Amax +Bmax = (2
K − 1) · 2 = 2K+1 − 2 (1)
Algorithm 1 Modified Iterative NTT
Input: Polynomial a(x) ∈ Zq[x] of degree n− 1
Input: primitive n-th root of unity ω ∈ Zq
Input: q ≡ 1 (mod 2n), n = 2l
Output: Polynomial a(x) =NTT(a) ∈ Zq[x]
1: for i from 1 by 1 to l do
2: m = 2l−i
3: for j from 0 by 1 to 2i−1 − 1 do
4: t = 2 · j ·m
5: for k from 0 by 1 to m− 1 do
6: curr ω = ω[2i−1k]
7: U ← a[t+ k]
8: V ← a[t+ k +m]
9: a[t+ k]← U + V
10: a[t+ k +m]← ω · (U − V )
11: end for
12: ω ← ω · ωi
13: end for
14: end for
15: return a
Algorithm 2 Modular Addition Algorithm
Input: A,B, q (K–bit positive integers)
Output: C ≡ A+B (mod q) (K–bit positive integer)
1: T1 = A+B
2: T2 = T1− q
3: T3 = T1− 2 · q
4: if (T2 < 0) then
5: C = T1
6: else if (T3 < 0) then
7: C = T2
8: else
9: C = T3
10: end if
Amax+Bmax−qmin = (2
K−1)·2−(2K−1+1) = 3·2K−1−3
(2)
Amax+Bmax−2·qmin = (2
K−1)·2−(2K−1+1)·2 = 2K−4
(3)
Results of Eqn. 1 and Eqn. 2 are K + 1-bit numbers, and
result of Eqn. 3 is a K-bit number. This shows that after
an addition operation, at most 2 subtraction operations are
required to reduce the result of the addition operation back to
K bits. Therefore, in Algorithm 2, the result C is guaranteed
to be a K-bit number. As can be seen, Algorithm 2 is built to
be a constant-time operation in terms of hardware perspective.
2) Modular Subtraction: For efficiency, we use partial
modular subtraction operations, instead of full modular sub-
traction. Our algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3. Assume A
is 0, largest value for B is 2K − 1, and smallest value for q is
2K−1 + 1.
Amin −Bmax = 0− (2
K − 1) = −2K + 1 (4)
Algorithm 3 Modular Subtraction Algorithm
Input: A,B, q (K-bit positive integers)
Output: C ≡ A−B (mod q)
1: T1 = A−B
2: T2 = T1 + q
3: T3 = T1 + 2 · q
4: if (T2 < 0) then
5: C = T3
6: else if (T1 < 0) then
7: C = T2
8: else
9: C = T1
10: end if
Algorithm 4 Word-Level Montgomery Reduction Algorithm
Input: C = A ·B (a 2K-bit positive integer)
Input: q (a K-bit positive integer)
Input: µ = −q−1 (mod 2w) (w-bit integer, w <= K)
Input: L = ⌈K/w⌉
Output: Res = C ·R−1 (mod q) where R = 2Lw (mod q)
1: T1 = C
2: for i from 0 to L− 1 do
3: T2 = T1 (mod 2w)
4: T3 = (T2 · µ) (mod 2w)
5: T1 = ⌊(T1 + (T3 · q))/2w⌋
6: end for
7: T4 = T1− q
8: if (T4 < 0) then
9: Res = T1
10: else
11: Res = T4
12: end if
Amin−Bmax+qmin = −2
K +1+(2K−1+1) = −2K−1+2
(5)
Amin−Bmax+2 ·qmin = −2
K+1+2 · (2K−1+1) = 3 (6)
Results of Eqn. 4 and Eqn. 5 are negative numbers, and
result of Eqn. 6 is a K-bit positive number. This shows that
after a subtraction operation, at most 2 addition operations
are required to guarantee a positive result. Therefore, in
Algorithm 3, the result C is guaranteed to be a positive K-bit
number. As can be seen, Algorithm 3 is built to be a constant-
time operation in terms of hardware perspective.
3) Modular Multiplication: For our entire hardware, we
utilized Montgomery Reduction algorithm [18], for reasons
explained in Section IV-A1. Word-level version of the Mont-
gomery reduction algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4. As
can be seen from the algorithm, Montgomery reduction is a
constant-time operation in terms of hardware perspective.
III. SIMPLE ENCRYPTED ARITHMETIC LIBRARY (SEAL)
SEAL, which was developed by Cryptography Research
Group at the Microsoft Research, is a homomorphic encryption
library. It provides an easy-to-use homomorphic encryption
Algorithm 5 Encryption Implementation in SEAL [1]
Input: m ∈ Rnt , p0, p1 ∈ R
n
q
Output: c0 = [p0u+ e1 +∆ ·m]q, c1 = [p1u+ e2]q
1: u
$
←− R2
2: p0u, p1u = NTT DOUBLE MULTIPLY (u, p0, p1)
3: e1, e2 ← χ
4: c0 = [p0u+ e1 +∆ ·m]q
5: c1 = [p1u+ e2]q
6: return c0, c1
7: function NTT DOUBLE MULTIPLY(u, p0, p1)
8: u =NTT(u)
9: p0u = p0 ⊙ u
10: p1u = p1 ⊙ u
11: p0u =INTT(p0u)
12: p1u =INTT(p1u)
13: return p0u, p1u
14: end function
TABLE I
TIMING OF ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM IN SEAL
Zq [x]/(x1024 + 1), q=27-bit, t=8-bit, 128-bit security
Operation Time (µs) Percentage (%)
u← R2 11.2 7.4 %
NTT DOUBLE MULTIPLY 46.4 30.1 %
e1, e2 ← χ 91.1 60.2 %
Others 3.1 2.3 %
library for people in academia and industry. SEAL uses FV ho-
momorphic encryption scheme for homomorphic operations.
In this paper, the proposed work focuses on accelerating the
encryption operation in SEAL by implementing the polyno-
mial multiplications in encryption operation on FPGA board.
Encryption operation in SEAL is implemented the same as
the encryption operation in Textbook-FV scheme as shown in
Algorithm 5. For the rest of the paper, a variable with a bar
over its name represents a polynomial in NTT domain. For
example, u and u are the same polynomials in polynomial
and NTT domains, respectively. In SEAL, public keys, p0 and
p1, are stored in NTT domain and other polynomials used
in encryption operation are stored in polynomial domain. In
SEAL, polynomials u, e1 and e2 are randomly generated for
each encryption operation. Since encryption operation requires
polynomial multiplications of u and public keys, p0 and p1,
the generated u is transformed into NTT domain using NTT
operation. After the inner multiplication of u and public keys
in NTT domain, inverse NTT operation is applied to transform
the results from NTT domain to polynomial domain. Finally,
necessary polynomial addition operations are performed to
generate ciphertexts, c0 and c1.
Timing breakdown of the encryption operation in SEAL
is shown in Table I. The average time for one encryption
operation in SEAL running on an Intel i9-7900X CPU is
151 µs. The average time for NTT-based large degree poly-
nomial multiplication in one encryption operation is 46.4 µs.
IV. THE PROPOSED DESIGN
In this section, design techniques used for our efficient and
scalable NTT-based polynomial multiplier, the design tech-
niques we used for our entire framework and our optimizations
are explained. For proof of concept design, we chose to im-
plement a 1024-degree polynomial multiplication architecture
targeting a 128-bit security level with 32-bit coefficients. For
the rest of the paper, n denotes the degree of the polynomial,
q denotes the prime used as modulus. Instead of fixing the
modulus size and the modulus, we implemented a scalable
architecture supporting modulus lenghts between 22 and 32
bits. Our techniques can easily be extended and optimized
for fixed-length moduli. Our modular multiplier works for all
NTT-friendly primes with the property q ≡ 1 (mod 2n), as
shown in Algorithm 4.
A. The Proposed Hardware
1) Modular Multiplier: To optimize large polynomial mul-
tiplications for FV scheme, a fast and efficient modular mul-
tiplier needs to be designed and utilized. In this work, we
designed a modular multiplier utilizing Montgomery reduction
techniques with a lazy reduction approach as explained in [14].
Our modular multiplier architecture is optimized for modulus
lengths between 22 and 32 bits.
We designed a 32-bit multiplier with 4 DSP blocks and an
adder tree. Since we are targeting an FPGA architecture, we
used 16-bit core multipliers, because of DSP size limitations.
On Spartan-6 Architectures, DSP slices include 18-bit signed
multipliers and on Virtex-7 Architectures, DSP slices include
18× 25-bit signed multipliers. To follow literature, we chose
to implement our multiplier for both architectures, therefore
we picked a core multiplier length of 16 bits. Our NTT
architecture is fully pipelined, therefore 32-bit multiplier has
pipeline registers between DSP blocks and adder tree. These
pipeline registers do not affect the throughput of the overall
architecture in terms of clock cycles, improving the overall
performance in terms of execution time significantly.
After a 32-bit multiplication operation, the result needs to be
reduced back to the bit-length of the modulus. For a scalable
architecture, we modified Algorithm 4 to achieve a fast and
efficient modular reduction operation. For efficiency, we utilize
the property:
q ≡ 1 (mod 2n) (7)
Any NTT-friendly prime q with this property can be written
as:
q = qH · 2
log22n + 1 (8)
For our proof of concept design, n = 1024 and log22n = 11,
which yields:
q = qH · 2
11 + 1 (9)
For Montgomery Reduction operation, if we select word size
w = 11,
µ = −q−1mod 211 ≡ −1 mod (mod 211) (10)
Algorithm 6 Word-Level Montgomery Reduction Algorithm
modified for NTT-friendly primes
Input: C = A ·B (a 2K-bit positive integer, 22 ≤ K ≤ 32)
Input: q (a K-bit positive integer, q = qH · 2
11 + 1)
Output: Res = C ·R−1 (mod M) where R = 233 (mod q)
1: T1 = C
2: for i from 0 to 2 do
3: T1H = T1 >> 11
4: T1L = T1 (mod 2
11)
5: T2 = 2′s complement of T1L
6: carry = T2[10] OR T1L[10]
7: T1 = T1H + (qH · T2[10 : 0]) + carry
8: end for
9: T4 = T1− q
10: if (T4 < 0) then
11: Res = T1
12: else
13: Res = T4
14: end if
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Mult
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Fig. 1. Flow of operations for Word-Level Montgomery Reduction algorithm
modified for NTT-friendly primes
Utilizing this property, we rewrite Montgomery Reduction as
shown in Algorithm 6. Flow of operations for Algorithm 6 is
shown in Figure 1.
To guarantee that one subtraction at the end of Algorithm 6
is enough, K < (3 × 11) needs to be satisfied. For K <
(2× 11), 2 iterations are required instead of 3. Our algorithm
can easily be modified to scale for other n. For example, for
n = 2048, w = 12 and for a modulus of length (4 × 12) <
K < (5×12), 5 iterations are required. For n = 4096, w = 13
and for a modulus of length (4 × 13) < K < (5 × 13), 5
iterations are required.
Hardware design for Algorithm 6 is shown in Figure 2.
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XY + Z is a multiply-accumulate operation, which can be
realized using DSP blocks inside the FPGA. Each DSP slice
has an optional output register, which can be utilized as the
pipeline register, eliminating the need to utilize FPGA fabric
registers for pipelining.
2) NTT unit: To achieve optimized performance for NTT
computations, we use the modified version of iterative NTT
algorithm shown in Algorithm 1. It should be noted that this
NTT operation is not a complete NTT operation. The resulting
polynomial coefficients are not in correct order. We need to
do a permutation operation in order to be able to get a correct
NTT result. However, since we are in NTT domain and every
operand that in the NTT domain will have the same scrambled
order, we can leave the result of this operation as it is without
doing the permutation. For polynomial multiplication, two
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Fig. 3. NTT Unit
polynomials will be converted to NTT domain and their inner
multiplication will be computed. This operation will yield a
result that is still in the same scrambled order.
After inner multiplication of operands in NTT form, we
apply inverse NTT operation to bring the operand back to
its polynomial domain. With slight modifications to inverse
NTT operations, we were able to reverse this scrambling
of NTT operands without any extra permutation operations,
which yielded a lower latency for NTT operations. In order to
realize the most inner loop of the nested for loops shown in
Algorithm 1, we designed an NTT unit, shown in Figure 3.
Latency of this NTT unit is 5 clock cycles.
Since each polynomial has 1024 coefficients, we decided to
utilize 64 of these NTT units and 128 separate BRAMS to hold
these coefficients. Each BRAM holds 8 of the coefficients and
since we are utilizing an in-place NTT algorithm, after reading
a coefficient from a BRAM, we only have 1024/128 = 8 clock
cycles to write back the computed result to its corresponding
place. This requirement forced us to design a datapath with at
most 6 clock cycle latency. The reason we designed a 5 clock
cycle latency datapath is that adding a 6th pipe stage did not
improve frequency.
3) Polynomial Multiplier: Overall design of our hardware
is shown in Figure 4. This hardware employs 64 separate
BRAMs for each precomputed parameter (ω, ω−1, Ψ, Ψ−1,
Modulus) and 128 separate BRAMs for input u. The multiplier
in front of input u is realizing uˆ = u · Ψ operation shown
in Algorithm 7, as the input is being received from the
PCIe link. Therefore, that step of the algorithm does not add
any latency to overall NTT operations. After the hardware
computes the NTT of input u, it realizes inner multiplication
with p0 and performs INTT on the result. After this operation,
the hardware realizes inner multiplication of u with p1 and
performs INTT on the result. After INTT operations, necessary
multiplications are also realized during the output stage of the
overall operation as shown in Algorithm 7.
B. Hardware/Software Co-Design Framework
In order to be able to speed-up encryption operation of the
SEAL library, we designed a proof of concept framework that
includes SEAL and an FPGA-based accelerator. To establish
communication between the software stack and the FPGA, we
utilized RIFFA driver [19], which employs a PCIe connection
between the CPU and the FPGA. Resulting framework is
W
Modulus
P1
P0
Psi−1
W−1
NTT
Input
Psi
xMUL INTT
Output
U
Fig. 4. Our Hardware
Algorithm 7 Operation Implemented in Our Design
Input: Polynomial u ∈ Zq[x]/(x
n + 1) of degree n− 1
Input: Public keys (p0, p1)
Input: Primitive 2n-th root of unity Ψ ∈ Zq
Output: Polynomials u · p0, u · p1 ∈ Zq[x]/(x
n + 1)
1: for i from 0 by 1 to n− 1 do
2: uˆ[i] = u[i] ·Ψi
3: end for
4: u =NTT(uˆ)
5: for i from 0 by 1 to n− 1 do
6: u p0[i] = u[i] · p0[i]
7: u p1[i] = u[i] · p1[i]
8: end for
9: ˆu p0 =INTT(u p0)
10: ˆu p1 =INTT(u p1)
11: for i from 0 by 1 to n− 1 do
12: u p0[i] = ˆu p0[i] · (Ψ
−i · n−1)
13: u p1[i] = ˆu p1[i] · (Ψ
−i · n−1)
14: end for
15: return u p0, u p1
shown in Figure 5. Inside SEAL, there is encrypt function
which work as decribed in III. In our modified version of
SEAL, this function sends its input data to the connected
FPGA and once FPGA returns the computed result, it returns
this result to its caller function. One important aspect of this
communication is that, since we utilized Direct Memory Ac-
cess (DMA), necessary data is directly sent from the memory
to the FPGA, instead of bringing it to the CPU first. This way,
cache of the CPU is not trashed and running this function does
not affect the performance of operations running on the CPU.
For this work, we are using Xilinx Virtex-7 FPGA VC707
Evaluation Kit which includes a PCIe x8 Gen2 Edge Con-
nector. This provides a 128-bit interface with a 250 MHz
clock, which provides a 32 Gbps bandwidth. As shown in
SEAL
NTT/INTT
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FPGAPC
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Hardware
RIFFA
FIFO
FIFO
250 200
MHz
NTT/
INTT
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Fig. 5. Hardware/Software Co-Design Framework
TABLE II
COMPARATIVE TABLE
Work LUTs Slice DSP BRAM Per.(ns) Lat.(µs)
[20] * 10801 3176 0 0 5.150 40.988
[20] * 6689 2112 4 8 4.154 33.094
[20] * 2464 915 16 14 4.050 32.282
This 1208 556 14 14 4.727 37.674
* Uses fixed modulus.
Figure 5, separate FIFO structures are utilized for data input
from the RIFFA driver and data output to the RIFFA driver.
This approach is utilized to enable a pipelined architecture
and maximize performance. For our datapath, we are utilizing
a 200 MHz clock to compensate the long critical paths of
our design. Although our design is optimized for 1024-degree
polynomials, it can easily be modified to realize multiplica-
tions for larger degree polynomials.
V. RESULTS AND COMPARISON
In order to be able to present a fair comparison with
the state of art in literature, the proposed NTT multiplier is
first implemented on a Spartan-6 FPGA (XC6SLX100) using
Verilog and implementation results are generated using Xilinx
ISE 14.7 with default synthesis option. This small version of
our NTT multiplier is designed to be as similar as possible
to the one in [20]. Both our work and [20] uses polynomial
degree of 1024 with 32-bit coefficients. The implementation
results are shown in Table II. Per. and Lat. in Table II stand
for clock period and latency, respectively. Our hardware has
latency that is almost identical to their design and our method
requires almost half the area with a comparable clock period.
Therefore, our method can easily be utilized for any design
requiring a generic NTT-friendly prime modulus.
Although SPARTAN-6 family provides fast computations
for polynomial multiplication operations, they lack fast I/O
infrastructure. Therefore, they are not suitable for accelerator
applications requiring high volume of data transfer. From
table II, our hardware achieves 1/37.674µs = 26543 poly-
nomial multiplications per second. A 32-bit coefficient 1024-
degree polynomial occupies 32 Kb memory space. Assuming
we only have to transfer one polynomial per multiplication
to the FPGA, a 829.4 Mbps I/O speed is required, which
achieves almost the same result as the CPU implementation.
In an accelerator setting, multiple polynomial multipliers need
to be instantiated inside the FPGA, which will create a heavy
burden on I/O.
In our accelerator design, we developed the architecture
described in Section IV into Verilog modules and realized
it using Xilinx Vivado 2018.1 tool for the Xilinx Virtex-
7 FPGA VC707 Evaluation Kit (XC7VX485T-2FFG1761).
The proposed work uses 33.8K LUTs (11.2%), 15.7K DFFs
(2.6%), 227.5 BRAMs (22%) and 476 DSPs (17%). There
is a plethora of works reported in the literature about mul-
tiplication of two large degree polynomials using NTT-based
multiplication schemes [21], [22], [20], [23], [24]. Although
some of these works also perform different operations, we only
reported the hardware and performance results for polynomial
multiplication part of these works. The works in the literature
and the work proposed in this paper are reported in Table III.
Although there are other accelerators [25] in the literature
performing RLWE encryption and decryption, these works use
small parameters and they are not designed for homomorphic
operations. Thus, they are not included in the comparison.
Since we target an efficient accelerator design, we imple-
mented our architecture on an FPGA and obtained perfor-
mance numbers on a real CPU-FPGA heterogeneous applica-
tion setting. Our Xilinx VC707 board can achieve a theoretical
32 Gbps I/O speed with a 250MHz clock. At this speed,
sending a polynomial of degree 1024 with 32-bit coefficients
from the CPU to FPGA via DMA takes 1µs (256 clock
cycles). In SEAL software, for encrypt operations, we replaced
polynomial multiplication operations with hardware-based op-
erations. In this setting, a pure software implementation yields
46.4µs, and an accelerator-based implementation, including
I/O operations, yields 1 + 1.3 + 2 = 4.3µs latency per poly-
nomial multiplication, where 1µs, 1.3µs and 2µs are spent
for input, polynomial multiplication and output, respectively.
Compared to software, we achieved a 11x speedup.
Encryption operation in SEAL performs two polynomial
multiplications requiring one NTT, two inner multiplication
and two INTT operations. Then, we modified our hardware to
perform one polynomial multiplication requiring one NTT, one
inner multiplication and one INTT. In this case, polynomial
multiplication takes 1.25µs. With careful pipelining, over-
lapping I/O operations with actual polynomial multiplication
computations, and assuming one of the operands for the poly-
nomial multiplication operation is already inside the FPGA
(a valid assumption for encryption and decryption operations
for homomorphic applications), we achieved a throughput of
almost 800K for degree-1024, 32-bit coefficient polynomial
multiplications per second. Decryption operation in SEAL
performs one polynomial multiplication in 29.3µs. Then,
the software performance is 1/29.3µs = 34129 polynomial
multiplications per second and we achieved an almost 24x
speedup over pure software implementation. Therefore, with
pipelining, overlapping I/O operations with actual decryption
or polynomial multiplication operations, and usng PCIe in
full-duplex, our hardware can provide almost 3x performance
compared to serial implementation.
TABLE III
COMPARATIVE TABLE
Work Scheme Platform n q LUTs/Gate DSP BRAM Freq. Perf. (ms)
[21] * GH-FHE 90-nm TSMC 2048 64-bit 26.7 M – – 666 MHz 7.750
[22] LTV VIRTEX-7 32768 32-bit 219 K 768 193 250 MHz 0.152
[20] * RLWE SPARTAN-6 256 21-bit 2829 4 4 247 MHz 0.006
SHE SPARTAN-6 1024 31-bit 6689 4 8 241 MHz 0.033
[23] * HE SPARTAN-6 1024 17-bit – 3 2 – 0.100
[24] * HE SPARTAN-6 1024 30-bit 1644 1 6.5 200 MHz 0.110
This work FV VIRTEX-7 1024 32-bit 33875 476 227.5 200 MHz 0.00125
* Uses fixed modulus.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an optimized FPGA implementa-
tion of a novel, fast and highly parallelized NTT-based polyno-
mial multiplier architecture, which is shown to be effective as
an accelerator for lattice-based homomorphic schemes. To the
best of our knowledge, our NTT-based polynomial multiplier
has the lowest latency in the literature.
For proof of concept, we utilize our architecture in a
framework for FV homomorphic encryption scheme, adopting
a hardware/software co-design approach, in which NTT oper-
ations are offloaded to the accelerator via PCIe bus while the
rest of operations in the FV scheme are executed in software
running on an off-the-shelf desktop computer. We realized the
framework on an FPGA operating with SEAL software and
the proposed framework accelerates the encryption operation
in SEAL. We used Xilinx VC707 board utilizing a Virtex-
7 FPGA for our implementation. We improved the latency of
NTT-based polynomial multiplications in encryption operation
by almost 11x compared to its pure software implementation.
We achieved a throughput of almost 800K for degree-1024,
32-bit coefficient polynomial multiplications per second.
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